Divergent Iranian Perspectives on the Zangezur Corridor Which Narrative Will Ultimately Prevail? Following the signing of the trilateral declaration at the White House on August 8, 2025, divergent perspectives have emerged in Tehran regarding the Zangezur Corridor. For instance, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior foreign policy advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, asserted that any pursuit of illegitimate objectives concerning the Zangezur Corridor would be met with a decisive Iranian response, he added that the corridor would ultimately become a graveyard for American mercenaries in the region. In addition the influential Kayhan daily portrayed the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor as a geopolitical threat to the region, while the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) adopted a more cautious stance. In contrast, The head of the Aras Free Zone does not consider the Zangezur Corridor to be detrimental to Iran. President Masoud Pezeshkian remarked that ‘there is no need to worry about minor issues such as Zangezur.’ Meanwhile, a statement by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed Tehran’s endorsement of efforts toward the finalization of a peace settlement between Baku and Yerevan, noting that Iran is inclined to support the unblocking of regional communication routes in the Caucasus as long as its national interests are taken into consideration.
Based on the mentioned complexity, some analysts argue that, in the aftermath of the twelve-day war, Tehran is experiencing a form of ‘strategic confusion.’ Others, however, contend that Iran’s policies toward the Zangezur Corridor are less indicative of confusion and more reflective of a deliberate ‘strategic ambiguity.’Against this backdrop, Baku, seeking to avoid entanglement in strategic trap, has based its approach on the official statements issued by the Pezeshkian administration. In this regard, President Ilham Aliyev has explicitly stated that the formal pronouncements of senior Iranian officials, such as the president and the foreign minister, serve as the recognized position for Azerbaijan. He has drawn a distinction between what he characterized as logical and constructive official positions and he characterized as minor and inconsequential.
Although official statements and declarations are accepted as representing the country’s formal position on the international stage, the question persists as to whether the Pezeshkian administration’s policy on Zangezur is considered the prevailing domestic discourse? To address this question, it is necessary first to examine the three competing domestic viewpoints, ultimately leading to a reasoned assessment.
Three competing perspectives
From Iran’s perspective, the trilateral White House declaration is perceived as the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor in an American-managed style. This interpretation is not limited to the transit route through Armenia, but encompasses the entire passage from the Republic of Azerbaijan to Turkey. The current situation has intensified the three competing viewpoints within Iran. Some believe that the situation poses maximal threats to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Pessimistic Perspective). Others argue that the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor could present potential opportunities for the country (Optimistic Perspective). A third group adopts a dualistic approach to the forthcoming developments, neither considering the corridor as an absolute evil nor as an unqualified good (Cautious Perspective).
Pessimistic Perspective
Supporters of Pessimistic perspective are mainly members of Iran’s armed forces or veteran diplomats, who, based on their expertise, approach the Zangezur Corridor from a politico-security angle. Advocates of this pessimistic outlook had a negative stance toward the corridor even before the White House trilateral statement. From their standpoint, launching the Zangezur Corridor will raise further demands and will not remain confined solely to transit passage. They argue that Azerbaijan’s call for “unimpeded passage” effectively undermines Armenia’s sovereignty, which in turn alters the geopolitical position of Iran and Armenia’s neighborhood.
In this sense, the White House statement juxtapose two contradictory notions side by side: recognizing Armenia’s sovereignty on the one hand, and emphasis on unimpeded passage for Azerbaijan on the other. This leaves the core issue unresolved and deferred to future negotiations. As a result, the corridor’s status has not fundamentally occurred; rather, the main shift is the entry of the United States—as the principal adversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran—something that, in Tehran’s view, restricts its ability to influence developments around the corridor. Any potential benefits for Iran are thus tied to U.S. approval, which runs counter to the principles of neighborhood relations in the South Caucasus.
Overall, those with this pessimistic outlook believe that the “American-style” Zangezur Corridor could gradually push Iran to the margins of regional arrangements in the long run. However, they acknowledge that Iran may obtain certain commercial and economic benefits through the corridor. Yet, such benefits are viewed as short-term and negligible compared with those gained by other actors, especially türkiye. Therefore, proponents of this view assess the corridor’s advantages in relative terms. Although the proponents of this view are generally opposed to the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor, they prefer its implementation by Russia over the United States due to Tehran–Moscow relations. Therefore, in order to counter U.S. influence in the South Caucasus, they have inclined toward security cooperation with Russia regarding the Zangezur Corridor. From the pessimists’ realist perspective, this choice represents selecting the lesser evil over the greater one.
Optimistic Perspective
The proponents of the optimistic perspective primarily include traders, private sector and institutions such as the Iran Chamber of Commerce, who focus on the transit opportunities offered by the Zangezur Corridor. They argue that the corridor can serve as a complement to existing routes. These advocates contend that transportation costs through the Zangezur Corridor are significantly higher than Iran's traditional routes, enabling Iran to maintain its competitive advantage. However, this perspective comes with certain prerequisites, often indirectly implied by its supporters. For instance, traders suggest that Iran must improve its relations with global powers to capitalize on commercial opportunities. In such a scenario, the Zangezur Corridor would not pose a threat to Iran but could instead provide substantial economic opportunities. From the optimists' viewpoint, the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor, particularly with U.S. involvement, would primarily disadvantage Russia rather than Iran. The presence of the U.S. could diminish Russia's influence over regional countries. Consequently, it is Moscow that would bear the costs of countering U.S. presence in the Caucasus, and Washington's involvement might even benefit Iran. Historically, Russia has not supported deepening Iran-Armenia economic ties. For example, in 2007, Moscow reduced the diameter of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline on the Armenian side to maintain its monopoly. However, it is unlikely that improved Iran-U.S. relations would lead Washington to obstruct Iran's economic ties with Armenia, particularly in the energy sector. The core of the optimistic view revolves around the concept of “economic integration and regional stability.” Advocates of this approach propose a shift in Iran’s foreign policy to create more favorable conditions. They recommend engaging in negotiations with involved parties and strengthening ties with global powers such as the United States and the European Union. They also emphasize that Iran should avoid getting entangled in minor geopolitical games and instead address the issue at the macro level of foreign policy, thereby turning the corridor dynamics into an opportunity for wealth generation. Nevertheless, the solutions proposed by this group are highly strategic and unlikely to materialize in the medium term, given the complexities of Iran’s foreign policy. Optimists tend to view national interests in absolute terms and, unlike pessimists, do not measure their gains relative to regional competitors. Critics argue that the optimists fail to grasp the fundamental nature of such corridors and are merely pursuing commercial profits. In their view, the ultimate goal of the Zangezur Corridor—as a link in the Middle Corridor—is to gradually impose geopolitical suffocation on Iran in the long run.
Cautious Perspective
The cautious perspective lies between the optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints. It neither fully embraces the economic optimism toward the Zangezur Corridor nor seeks its outright rejection. Instead, it aims to preservation of national interests and prevent the weakening of Iran's position in the Caucasus. Diplomats and segments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to their familiarity with on-the-ground realities and international pressures, tend to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Researchers and foreign policy experts likewise, with analytical reasoning, seek to prevent Iran’s exclusion from regional dynamics. The administration of President Pezeshkian has also adopted a cautious stance to the Zangezur Corridor, aiming to minimize political tensions with neighbors while preserving a level of benefits for the Islamic Republic of Iran. From the cautious perspective, even limited and controlled participation can ensure that Iran remains engaged in the regional game.
The central element of this view is the “management of unavoidable realities. Proponents of the cautious approach are concerned about Iran's strategic encirclement, the reduction of Nakhchivan’s energy dependence on Iran, disruptions in trade with Armenia, and the growing influence of the United States. However, they argue that by ensuring Armenia's sovereignty over the route and preventing external interference, the potential damages can be mitigated. Proponents of the cautious perspective, in media and international forums, express agreement with the Zangezur Corridor to prevent Iran's isolation. While they minimally endorse the corridor on the international stage, in domestic circles, they avoid fully accepting it and emphasize maintaining defensive-security measures against it. As reflected in the statement of Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Zangezur Corridor is conditionally supported by Iran, with significant concerns about foreign interference in the region.
The proposed solutions by this group include focusing on active diplomacy, negotiations with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia to secure security guarantees, strengthening of alternative routes such as the Aras Corridor, and close monitoring of developments to prevent external intervention. They further suggest that Iran should employ projects such as underpasses or overpasses to ensure uninterrupted trade flows. Given the fact that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is considered a separate entity from the government, the administration is compelled to take into account not only economic concerns under sanction conditions, but also the security considerations emphasized by the IRGC regarding the Zangezur Corridor.
The Likely Dominant Perspective in Practice
The twelve-day war with Israel, coupled with U.S. involvement in bombing nuclear facilities, has generally strengthened the pessimistic approach in Iran’s foreign policy. However, the costs of the war and the government’s limited resources have pushed Tehran toward a cautious perspective on various issues, including the Zangezur Corridor. Therefore, although Iran has adopted a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding South Caucasus affairs, the Pezeshkian administration (which assumed power in July 2024), focuses on pragmatism to reduce tensions with neighboring states and safeguard economic interests. The government seeks to prevent confrontations in West Asia from spilling over to neighboring countries under pretexts such as the Zangezur Corridor or allegations of collusion with Israel. Consequently, in the short term, the cautious perspective is most likely to dominate Iran's policy toward the Zangezur Corridor.
Written by the CRESCENT's analysis team