Syria is an extremely important and vital country for Iran. On the one hand, it connects Iran to the organizations it supports by land, and on the other hand, it connects Iran to the Mediterranean, which will facilitate the evasion of sanctions. From this perspective, an authority change in Syria means significant losses for Iran. Therefore, Iran will take certain initiatives to compensate for these losses. It would be useful to take a detailed look at the losses in question and possible Iranian initiatives.
The roots of relations between Iran and the Assad authority date back to the pre-revolutionary period. However, the events that developed during and after the Iran-Iraq war that occurred immediately after the revolution strengthened these bilateral relations. During the Iran-Iraq war, Syria stopped the flow of the pipeline that carried 500 thousand barrels of oil per day, one of Iraq's important financial resources, from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Thus, Iraq was deprived of financial resources and its ability to fight against Iran was reduced. In return, Iran provided Syria with $1 billion in oil aid. In the following stages, Syria allowed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to operate in the regions of Syria close to Lebanon. This was crucial in terms of Iran's logistical support for Hezbollah. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq War, Syria provided Iran with Scud missiles and provided technical training for Iranian engineers on the missiles. This development formed the basis of Iran's current missile program.
The Iranian-Syrian relations that started this way have developed over time, creating important partnerships between the two countries. These partnerships, over time, have encompassed strategic issues and allowed the two countries to be categorized within a bloc. This bloc, which is called the "axis of resistance", has enabled Iran to spread into the Arab geography. In the aforementioned block, Iran and Syria are states, while the other actors of the bloc are militia groups. From this perspective, the Assad authority had the most important strategic position after Iran within the “axis of resistance”. Indeed, based on information from an interview with Hassan Nasrallah on Khamenei's official website, Syria is considered as the pillar of the “axis of resistance”. In the same article, it was stated that in a conjuncture where Syria (the Assad authority) does not exist, the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine will be marginalized. Even this statement on Khamenei's official website, without any additional commentary, clearly shows us what kind of loss Iran has suffered.
Although Iran describes this issue in the context of the “resistance axis”, the existence of the Assad authority in Syria has also provided significant benefits to Iran from a pragmatic perspective. During the Iran-Iraq war, while Saddam was trying to form an Arab bloc against Iran, Syria prevented this situation. Before the overthrow of Assad, logistical support was provided to organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. In addition, many militia groups within Syria fought on behalf of Iran at the time. Indeed, in the book titled "The Different Narration of Iran's Logic of Being in Syria" written by important figures who were key factors in Iran's decision-making mechanism during the Syrian Civil War, such as Qasem Soleimani, the IRGC Jerusalem Commander, Hossein Hamedani, one of the founders of the IRGC, and Ali Akbar Vilayeti, the chief advisor to the Supreme Leader, the authors collectively referred to Syria as "Iran's strategic depth". In addition, the authors argued that if Iran did not fight in Syria, it would have to fight within its own borders. Therefore, the fall of the Assad authority means, in Iran's own words, the fall of the pillar of the resistance and the war reaching its own borders.
In light of the above-mentioned issues, it is obvious that Syria is not an ordinary country for Iran, and the fall of the Assad authority has brought great losses for Iran. Therefore, it cannot be expected that Iran will remain unresponsive to the developments in Syria. In this context, just like in every country, Iran's diplomatic tradition, past experiences and conjunctural reactions give us some clues.
The main concern for Iran is whether Assad's successor will push Syria away from Tehran's orbit. At the same time, Tehran was wary of Trump using Assad's removal as leverage to intensify economic and political pressure on Iran, either to force concessions or to destabilise the Islamic Republic.
When we look at the current situation in Iran, we see that Iran is pursuing a "wait and see" policy inspired by its long-standing diplomacy. While analyzing the situation after the incident, Iran accuses Assad authority of not showing the necessary will to fight, and on the other hand, it accuses its other ally in Syria, Russia, of not cooperating sufficiently. However, it should not be forgotten that while doing all this, it is also making preparations for the upcoming process. In this context, Iran is initially taking care not to block the path to a possible diplomatic agreement by following a cautious foreign policy. This is evidenced by Iran's softening of its stance towards the opposition groups that seized power in Syria and its use of the term "armed opposition groups" instead of the "Takfiri groups" it previously used. In this context, although Iran is aware of Turkey's new political stance in Syria, it does not demonstrate a tough stance against Turkey through official channels. The situation shows that Iran has left the door open for Turkey’s role as a mediator.
Another issue is Iran’s sphere of influence in Syria. As mentioned, Iran had deep relations with the Baath Regime that was in power in Syria for many years, and thanks to these relations, it still has influence over the partial elements that it can mobilize. Therefore, it is likely that it will use these elements, if necessary, both to sit at the diplomacy table more strongly and to keep conflicts away from its own borders.
Since Syria is a region where geopolitical interests clash, major powers have tried to balance their interests with others. In particular, the "Astana process" launched in 2016 under the leadership of Iran, Russia and Turkey has had a significant impact on the regional dynamics. Although Russia is out of the game in the current situation, it would be somewhat naive to considet that Iran will leave the field completely alone. It is no doubt that İran will at least be inclined to act in cooperation with Turkey. If external factors do not work, Tehran will try to maximize its interests with the support of the "proxy" forces which it has been forming in Syria for years.
Javid Mammadov