How do you assess the war between Israel and Iran in terms of its impact on regional geopolitics in the Middle East?
The war between Iran and Israel can be assessed as a final showdown between the two main regional actors in the Middle East. Previously, Iran had contained the threat from Israel at the level of its proxy militias, while preserving its own capacity for rivalry with the United States in the region. Iran's model for containing its regional rival was based on posing an existential threat to Israel along its borders and within its surrounding environment.
Currently, Israel, capitalizing on the October 7th operation, is seeking a complete change in the region's security equation. Israel's goal, contrary to Iran's strategy, is to confine Iran and its power within its geographical borders. Israel attempted, with a powerful strike and U.S. support, to achieve its ultimate objective before its own regional security equation could be consolidated. However, miscalculations regarding certain internal factors within Iran led to the failure of Israel's plan. This demonstrated that even if Iran's regional allies are currently contained, Iran alone possesses significant capabilities to create deterrence. Iran's ability to inflict serious damage on Israel's existence, even if confined to its geographical borders, was proven to Israel during the 12-day war.
However, it must be considered that Israel can never confine Iran within its geographical borders due to Iran's geographical size, its diverse land, sea, and air access, its abundant internal resources, and the variety of its bordering neighbors. These factors will certainly render the containment of Iran unsuccessful, and ultimately, Iran can only be threatened by one or more neighbors aligned with Israel. Furthermore, the reluctance of countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to normalize relations with Israel means these countries do not pose a potential threat to Iran on behalf of Israel. In contrast, the model that Iran implemented for Israel, due to Israel's limited geographical dimensions and access routes, had managed to bring Israel to the brink of suffocation in its relations and survival.
Israel's recent unchecked actions and its attempt to create a radical security equation in the Middle East, without considering the interests of other members, could activate the potential for an existential threat to the Arab and Turkish rulers of the region. This may cause these countries, even for a short period, to see themselves as having common interests with Iran and move towards a regional consensus against Israel's actions and regional equations.
Which countries in the region are likely to be most affected by the outcome of the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, and how might this change diplomatic relations?
Each country in the region will be affected proportionately by this war. The Arab countries, especially the Persian Gulf states, are aware of the importance of the Strait of Hormuz. They know that if Iran is cornered and the United States enters the theater of war, there is a possibility of serious disruption in the Strait of Hormuz by Iran. This could severely disrupt a large part of these countries' economic lifeline.
Iran's targeting of the U.S. military base in Qatar was a strong message to the Arab countries in the region that host American bases. This message showed that even with friendly and fraternal relations, if a threat emanates from their soil and Iran's security is violated by these bases, the security and tranquility of these countries will be endangered. These factors have led the Arab countries, especially in the Persian Gulf, to try to maintain a moderate stance in their relations with both sides of the conflict. Specifically, they have placed the reconstruction of their relations with Iran on their agenda to remain safe from Iran's military responses during a conflict.
These countries know that if the violation of Iran's security increases, Iran will proportionately challenge the security of the region. Furthermore, the United States has shown that even in supporting Israel, its staunchest ally in the region, it lacks the necessary deterrent power against Iran. To protect its own security, Iran will even launch military attacks on U.S. targets. Therefore, there is no leverage to protect these countries from the military threat of Iran, and for this reason, these countries try not to violate the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. News also indicates Saudi Arabia's reluctance to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel due to recent events.
What is the future of the "Axis of Resistance"? Is Iran still capable of supporting these actors?
The future of the Axis of Resistance is currently in a phase of reconstruction and, due to one important factor, will certainly have comeback in the future. In the domain of the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic of Iran—except in Syria where it invested in a state actor—has entered and invested in other countries based on ideology and through the tool of shared beliefs. This has meant that, in reality, the Islamic Republic of Iran's "field" is a segment of the populace that shares ideological and intellectual commonalities with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, this capability, being people-centric, can lead to the recovery and return of the Axis of Resistance.
In Syria as well, given the current trend of internal conflicts, the Axis of Resistance can become a place for the formation of paramilitary groups that will have the ability to disrupt the current order that is taking shape. An important point to consider is that the Axis of Resistance is, in fact, a people-based axis. Therefore, where the local indigenous people insist on continuing the resistance, although they may sometimes be weak and sometimes strong, They will eventually remain.. An example of this has been observed in recent years in Yemen, Iraq, and even Lebanon. These actions range from small attritional movements and occasional small operations to large-scale operations after organizing and consolidating power.
M. Sadeghi