What was the main reason for the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel to start? Do you think Iran was prepared for it, or were Israel and the USA able to catch Tehran off guard?
Israel justifies its aggression against Iran by citing Tehran’s nuclear program. Yet the real motives behind this reckless move run much deeper. At its core, this conflict is yet another attempt by Israel to reshape the Middle East. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, the weakening of the Resistance Axis, the potential fall of Assad, the prospect of a Syria realigned toward Israel, the presence of a hawkish U.S. president, and Israel’s already tarnished global image—leaving it with little left to lose in Western public opinion—have created a perfect opportunity to deal a decisive blow to Iran. By crushing the only regional power with both the capability and the resolve to challenge its hegemony, Israel aims to impose a new order in the Middle East—with itself at the center.
Iran had long anticipated the possibility of war with Israel and the U.S. But the timing of the attack caught it off guard.
Did the loss of several high-ranking officers and nuclear physicists affect the mindset of the Iranian elite? Can we consider these events as “Iran’s 9/11,” and assume that nothing will be handled the same way anymore?
The assassination of military commanders, scientists, and civilians - coupled with the brazen timing of the attack during sensitive negotiations - has profoundly impacted both Iran's political elite and civil society. Current indicators suggest that resistance to IAEA cooperation has reached historically low levels within Iran's policymaking circles. Indeed, the strategic rationale for nuclear weapons development as a deterrent has gained unprecedented traction in Iranian security discourse since the attack.
This watershed moment will likely produce significant societal reverberations and may precipitate shifts in Iran's foreign policy orientation. However, the Islamic Republic's decision-making processes typically eschew abrupt policy reversals in favor of incremental adaptation. Any substantive changes will likely manifest through measured, phased implementation with rigorous cost-benefit analysis at each stage. Consequently, we should anticipate evolutionary rather than revolutionary policy adjustments - a marked contrast to the paradigm shifts witnessed in U.S. foreign policy following 9/11.
What is the future of the Axis of Resistance? Is Iran still capable of supporting these actors?
The future trajectory of the Axis of Resistance will largely depend on critical factor: the emerging regional order following current conflicts, and the strategic consensus reached by member states' joint think tanks regarding the new geopolitical reality. However, I contend that we are unlikely to witness the revival of the Resistance Axis in its previous configuration. In fact, the transformation of the Axis's strategic posture predates even the October 7th events. We are likely to observe a more decentralized network of allies - one characterized by autonomous decision-making at the nodal level, yet maintaining operational coordination. Traditional conceptual frameworks like Iran's "defensive belt" as the core of resistance are losing analytical validity. Iran will increasingly prioritize autonomous self-defense capabilities.
Iran's support for resistance groups has consistently operated through dual political and military channels (primarily training and advisory roles). While operational constraints on military support have intensified for some groups and relaxed for others, the shifting regional dynamics are unlikely to diminish Tehran's fundamental commitment to supporting allies. Paradoxically, Iran's perceived strategic isolation during recent conflicts may actually bolster domestic public support for such alliances within Iranian civil society.
How do Iranians evaluate the behavior of countries in the region during the war? Is Tehran satisfied with the level of friendliness from its neighbors, or does it feel more or less alienated amid serious tensions with the West?
Tehran does not fundamentally structure its relations with neighboring and regional states through an Israel-centric paradigm. However, in this war, regional countries could be divided into three categories: friendly nations, neutral nations, and nations aligned with Israel. Iran does not have particular expectations from countries allied with Israel, but the reaction of the rest of the regional states was favorable to Tehran. Iranian officials see the current environment as suitable for continuing neighborhood policies and shaping certain coordination and cooperation efforts.
Could a new round of Abraham Accords cause a major shift in Iran’s foreign policy? In theory, this could end Israel’s regional isolation. Does Iran have a plan to counter it or prevent possible signatories from joining?
As previously stated, Iran's regional policy is not formulated through an Israel-centric framework, but rather in response to the conduct of regional states. Tehran's foreign policy calculus will be shaped more significantly by the outcomes of current conflicts than by the Abraham Accords, as these confrontations are proving more consequential in redefining the regional order.
If the Accords persist and produce tangible security and economic results—such as the IMEC corridor project—one could argue that Israel has effectively overcome its regional isolation.
Iran's approach toward states seeking to join the Abraham Accords will be contingent upon their actual policies. Should their actions, particularly in security matters or regional order-building, demonstrate hostility toward Iranian interests, Tehran will calibrate its responses proportionally.
Can we deduce from Iranian officials’ recent visit to China that Iran wants to modernize its armed forces—especially its air force—with Chinese help, even at the expense of its cooperation with Russia?
Iran's military relations have largely remained opaque due to Western sanctions and external pressures. While Tehran's apparent interest in Chinese equipment for modernizing its air fleet represents a plausible development, this should not be interpreted as a cooling of relations with Moscow. Russia's constrained production capacity and its Ukrainian engagement - which has generated substantial domestic military demands - remain key mitigating factors.
Assessing the precise extent of Russian or Chinese assistance in this conflict requires access to classified data unavailable to open-source analysts, rendering most current assessments speculative. Nevertheless, should Tehran and Beijing successfully overcome historical impediments in their bilateral relations, this conflict could potentially serve as a strategic inflection point in Sino-Iranian military cooperation.
Has the war truly ended, or was it just the beginning of much greater violence? Are Iran, the USA, and Israel close to reaching a compromise, or are they still far apart?
The conclusion of the 12-day conflict merely marks the end of one phase in the ongoing series of confrontations between Iran and Israel. These hostilities have manifested in a more direct, violent, and overt manner compared to their historical pattern of conflict. However, whether the next phase will involve heightened security tensions or renewed warfare—and whether it will escalate or de-escalate—depends on several critical factors:
- The extent of damage to Iran's nuclear program
- The severity of Israel's demonstrated air defense vulnerabilities
- China's strategic calculus and potential role
- The United States' capacity to engage in another regional conflict
- Global oil market dynamics
The trajectory of Iran-U.S. negotiations—specifically whether they follow an identifiable pattern of short-term conflict → maximalist negotiations → renewed conflict until one party achieves decisive dominance or not?
Regardless of whether this cyclical pattern persists, one conclusion appears virtually certain: Iran is highly unlikely to relinquish its uranium enrichment rights. Consequently, any potential U.S.-Iran agreement that fails to halt enrichment would not extinguish the Tehran-Tel Aviv confrontation. Even a "zero enrichment" agreement would, at best, temporarily postpone hostilities. At its core, this conflict represents a structural struggle over regional order. The fundamental asymmetry between these two powers guarantees the continuation of their rivalry through various modalities until a new equilibrium is established.
Erfan Pazhoohandeh