Amid the escalation of military conflicts and geopolitical tensions in recent months, a familiar claim has once again resurfaced in political and media discourse: that international law has lost its effectiveness and has become a set of meaningless and unenforceable rules. This perception is largely based on the assumption that if states are capable of violating fundamental principles of international law — such as the prohibition on the use of force, the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets, and similar core norms — then the international legal order itself must be devoid of legitimacy and effectiveness. Yet such an approach is often rooted more in political reaction than in legal analysis of contemporary crises and challenges. To understand the issue more accurately, it is necessary to examine it through several key dimensions.
First, a distinction must be made between the “violation” of a legal rule and the “collapse” of that rule. In no legal system does the mere occurrence of violations invalidate the whole legal system itself. The existence of theft, murder, corruption, violence, or violations of citizens’ rights within domestic legal systems does not negate the legitimacy of domestic law; rather, it reinforces the necessity of legal norms and enforcement mechanisms. International law follows the same logic. Violations of the prohibition on the use of force, international humanitarian law, or human rights norms may indeed reflect weaknesses in the political and enforcement mechanisms of the international system, but they do not necessarily signify the death of international law. If such reasoning were accepted, no legal system in the world could ever be considered effective.
Today, the principal challenge facing international law is not merely the violation of rules, but rather their selective, instrumentalized, and double-standard application. Many states invoke the UN Charter, the right to self-defense, international peace and security, and humanitarian law the moment they face external threats. Yet the same states often refuse to accept comparable levels of accountability regarding their own human rights obligations — particularly in relation to freedom of expression, women’s rights, political freedoms, access to the internet and information, and other fundamental liberties. A state that insists on respect for international law in the international arena cannot simultaneously exempt itself from legal accountability for systematic repression and recurring violations of fundamental rights at the national level. International law cannot be invoked only where it aligns with political interests while being ignored elsewhere. It is precisely this double standard that erodes public trust in the international legal order. Within this context, debates surrounding the assassination or targeting of political leaders also require a more nuanced and principled analysis beyond immediate political reactions. There is little doubt that the assassination of political officials and heads of state stands in tension with the logic of stability underlying international law and with fundamental principles such as the prohibition on the use of force, the prohibition of terrorist acts, and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. Yet the central question remains: should international law become merely a protective shield for states, regardless of the nature and conduct of their governments?
A crisis of legitimacy emerges when governments with extensive records of domestic repression, systematic human rights abuses, suppression of freedoms, promotion of extremist ideologies, and disregard for the will of the majority of their own populations are nevertheless able to shield themselves from meaningful accountability solely through appeals to sovereignty and international immunities. The fundamental weakness of international law becomes evident precisely at this point — not simply in the occurrence of war or military attacks, but in its inability to effectively confront governments that systematically violate the rights of their own people while continuing to benefit from the privileges and protections of the international order. The experience of regimes such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar cases demonstrates that, at times, the international system functions less as a protector of human rights and more as a mechanism for preserving structures of power. Naturally, governments that themselves systematically undermine international law and fundamental human rights should not indefinitely enjoy the full protections and privileges of the international legal order without meaningful accountability. It is often the existence and persistence of such regimes — rather than merely military confrontation against them — that obstruct international law from achieving its most fundamental objectives: the preservation of international peace and security and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
At the same time, perhaps the clearest indication of the continuing relevance of international law is the constant effort by states to justify their actions through legal arguments. Virtually no state openly declares that international law is irrelevant. On the contrary, all actors seek to frame their conduct in the language of self-defense, international peace and security, military necessity, humanitarian necessity, or counterterrorism. This persistent need for legal justification itself demonstrates that international law remains the primary language of legitimacy in the global order. If international law were truly meaningless, states would have no need to provide legal rationales for their conduct.
Therefore, the contemporary crisis should not be understood primarily as a crisis of the “existence” of international law, but rather as a crisis of its equal and consistent application. The central problem is not the absence of legal norms, but the absence of political will to apply them impartially. As long as states continue to treat international law merely as an instrument for defending political interests rather than as a framework of reciprocal obligations, the gap between legal norms and political reality will persist. Nevertheless, the very fact that struggles over legitimacy continue to unfold through legal language demonstrates that international law is not only still alive, but remains one of the principal arenas of political, ethical, and normative contestation in the contemporary international order.
Sara Famoori