The ceasefire that entered into force on 27 November 2024 was drafted to reset the security environment in southern Lebanon: Hezbollah would pull its fighters and heavy weapons north of the Litani River, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would take over responsibility for the area, and Israel would withdraw from the positions it still held inside Lebanon. One year later, these provisions exist largely as reference points. The formal framework remains intact, but the reality on the ground has developed along its own logic, shaped more by the calculations of Israel, Hezbollah and Lebanon’s political system than by the agreement itself.
Hezbollah insists that it withdrew from the south, yet developments over the past year point instead to a change in tactics rather than a change in territory. Israeli strike reports show a pattern of small-unit activity, weapons storage and launch infrastructure south of the Litani, all targeted throughout 2025. The LAF’s public presentation in November of an underground Hezbollah complex in the Zibqin Valley confirmed that the group maintained infrastructure in locations the ceasefire was meant to clear. Hezbollah did not openly challenge the agreement, but it did not treat the southern front as a demilitarized zone. What it altered was visibility, not presence. Israel moved in parallel, although from the opposite direction. The IDF did not withdraw from several hilltops and forward sites it held on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line, and continued to strike targets across southern Lebanon and deeper inside the country. Israeli officials linked their forward posture to what they described as Hezbollah’s ongoing activity in areas the movement was supposed to leave. Yet in practice, Israeli policy was shaped by the conviction that deterrence and early disruption mattered more than literal adherence to the ceasefire text. By early 2025, the agreement had become part of diplomatic messaging rather than a structure that shaped military decisions.
In Beirut, the state was formally placed at the center of the post-war arrangement, but it did not gain the authority the agreement assumed. The government endorsed a policy in August 2025 that restated the principle of a state monopoly on weapons and welcomed an LAF plan tied to Resolution 1701. Within weeks, political objections from actors who were unwilling to confront Hezbollah ensured that the decision did not advance beyond statements. The army increased its presence in the south and publicized dismantled Hezbollah sites, but avoided actions that would provoke a direct clash. Its room for maneuver remained defined by what Hezbollah tolerated, not by what the ceasefire prescribed. This environment shaped Hezbollah’s behaviour. The group absorbed steady losses from Israeli strikes throughout the year, culminating in the assassination of its chief of staff, Haytham Tabatabai, in the southern suburbs of Beirut on 23 November 2025. The response was contained. Hezbollah did not escalate with large rocket barrages or cross-border operations. The priority remained internal strength: preserving political influence, maintaining a quiet but persistent presence in the south, and rebuilding capabilities further north. A major confrontation at a time when the Lebanese landscape remained fragile offered little strategic benefit.
Israeli decision makers drew similar conclusions from the opposite vantage point. The persistence of Hezbollah activity south of the Litani, the slow return of displaced northern residents and the experience of the previous two years’ regional escalation reinforced the view that the ceasefire had not produced meaningful improvement in Israel’s northern security. Israeli policy focused on denying Hezbollah the ability to rebuild its military networks and signalling that operational leaders were not immune from targeting, even in the capital. By the end of 2025, domestic debate in Israel revolved around how and when to reshape the situation in the north, not around preserving the ceasefire framework negotiated a year earlier. External efforts to stabilise the arrangement could not compensate for the gap between the agreement’s assumptions and the political realities in Lebanon and Israel. The United States and European states supported the language of Resolution 1701 and encouraged the Lebanese government’s brief moves in August, but they could not provide the internal political alignment Beirut would need to impose its authority, nor the verification mechanisms Israel would require to treat the ceasefire as reliable. No external power had the leverage to shift the foundations of the arrangement.
The first year of the Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire has therefore produced a limited but clear result. The agreement has reduced the pace of open conflict compared to the 2024 fighting, but it has not changed the fundamental distribution of power along the border. Hezbollah remains active south of the Litani, though in a more discreet form. Israel maintains positions inside Lebanese territory and continues its strike campaign. The LAF is more visible in the south, yet still operates within boundaries set by Lebanon’s political balance. The strike that killed Tabatabai, and the muted response that followed, illustrates how far the situation has drifted from the logic of the ceasefire’s text. The agreement survives on paper, but the actual behaviour of the parties is determined by their own strategic judgments, not by the obligations laid out in November 2024.